1	JIAYI LIU
2	Jamboree Business Centre
3	2691 Richter Avenue, Suite 115.
4	Irvine CA 92606
5	Defendant in Pro Per
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11	SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
12	FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE
13	Olen Commercial Realty Corp., a Nevada) Case No.: 30-2020-01160931-CL-UD-CJC
14	corporation,) DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF
15	Plaintiff, MOTION AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF
16) ORDER RE: UNLAWFUL
17	vs.) DETAINER (COMMERCIAL)) ORDER AGAINST JIAYI LIU,
18	JIAYI LIU, an individual; and DOES 1 to 10,) inclusive,) MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES.
19) Defendants) [C.C.P. § 1008]
20) TIME; 8:30 AM
21 22	DATE; November 27, 2020 DEPT; C61
23	JUDGE; Glenn Mondo
24	
25	
26	TO EACH PARTY AND ITS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant JIAYI LIU proceeding in Pro
27	Per shall and hereby do move the Court to reconsider its Order re: UNLAWFUL
28	DETAINER (COMMERCIAL) ORDER AGAINST JIAYI LIU, dated
	October 21, 2020, ("Order"). This motion is made pursuant to C.C.P. § 1008,
	new and different facts and circumstances, and is supported by the

- 1 -

accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, and the Declaration of JIAYI LIU in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, Defendant would state hereon.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES INTRODUCTION

On or about June 7, 2018, Defendant JIAYI LIU entered into a written lease agreement with Plaintiff Olen Commercial Realty Corp, to rent the real property located at 2691 Richter Avenue # 115, Irvine, 92606, (premises). The lease commenced on June 7, 2018 and under the lease agreement there is a clause for annual rent adjustment as follows; beginning on July 1, 2019 through June 30, 2020 the minimum Monthly Base Rent shall be \$2,999.00 and beginning on July 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021 the minimum Monthly Base Rent shall be \$3,089.55. The Monthly Base Rent set forth above does not include monthly Common Area Operating Expenses of \$474.32.

The defendant has been fulfilling her obligations under the lease agreement which includes adequate payment of the rent until the breakout of COVID-19 in January 2020. The COVID-19 pandemic has presented significant challenges to Defendant's business and employees. Small Business Majority survey data found that up to 44% of businesses are at risk of shutting down, including Defendant's Business. From February to April 2020, there was a 22% drop of active business owners nationwide according to data released through the Census Current Population Survey. Minority-owned businesses are disproportionately impacted: the number of active businesses owned by African-Americans dropped by 41%, Latinx by 32%, Asians by 25%, and immigrants by 36%.¹ The impact of the COVID-19 was severe that Governor Newsom of California had to signed three bills that will help support small businesses to recover from the COVID-19 induced recession.²

On or about October, 2020, Plaintiff filed a complaint for unlawful detainer- commercial against Defendant. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant was wrongfully in possession of the

¹ https://www.gov.ca.gov/2020/09/09/governor-newsom-signs-bills-to-support-small-businesses-grappling-withimpact-of-covid-19-pandemic-bolster-economic-recovery/ ² ibid

premises. Before filing the said Complaint, defendant was not served with the mandatory three (3) days notice to pay rent or quit.

The Defendant hereby states that the decisions granting Unlawful Detainer (Commercial) Order against her were not in accordance to applicable laws and, therefore, files this Motion for Reconsideration.

ARGUMENT

1. THE COURT MUST CONSIDER FACTS NOT PREVIOUSLY <u>CONSIDERED THAT DIRECTLY AFFECTS THE COURT'S</u> <u>RULING.</u>

A. Defendant Present A Previously Unconsidered Fact.

California Code of Civil Procedure § 1008 (a) governs a party's means to seek reconsideration of a court order, under the prerequisite of presenting new or different facts, circumstances, or law." C.C.P. § 1008 (a). The purpose of C.C.P. § 1008 is "to restrict motions to reconsider to circumstances where a party offers the court some fact or authority that was not previously considered by it." *Gilberd v. ACT Transit* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1500.

In this motion, defendant requests that this Court reconsider its Order in light of Plaintiff not serving the defendant the mandatory three (3) days notice to pay rent or quit.

Failure to provide a legally sufficient notice is a complete defense to an unlawful detainer. "Unlawful detainer is a unique body of law and its procedures are entirely separate from the procedures pertaining to civil actions generally." (*Losornio v. Motta* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 110, 115 [78 Cal.Rptr.2d 799].) "Sections 1159 through 1179a comprise what is commonly known as the *Unlawful Detainer Act* ; the statutes are ' broad in scope and available to both lessors and lessees who have suffered certain wrongs committed by the other.' " (*Palm Property Investments, LLC v. Yadegar* (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1424 [123 Cal.Rptr.3d 816]; see *Losornio v. Motta, supra*, at p. 113 .).

Strict compliance with the statutory notice requirements is a prerequisite to filing an unlawful detainer action. (Lamey v. Masciotra (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 709, 713 [78 Cal.Rptr. 344].) "Under California statutory law a tenant is entitled to a 3-day notice to pay rent or quit which may be enforced by summary legal proceedings (Code Civ. Proc., § 1161) but this notice is valid and enforceable only if the lessor strictly complies with the specifically described notice conditions. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1162.)" (Ibid.) A copy of the notice of eviction must be attached to the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1166, subd. (d)(1)(A).) A complaint, that does not comply with the notice requirements, fails to state a cause of action for unlawful detainer and the court lacks both personal and subject matter jurisdiction. (Kwok v. Bergren181 Cal. Rptr. 795].) in section 1161. That statute provides in pertinent part: "A tenant of real property... is guilty of unlawful detainer. When he or she continues in possession... after a neglect or failure to perform... conditions or covenants of the lease or agreement under which the property is held... and three days' notice, in writing, requiring the performance of such conditions or covenants, or the possession of the property, shall have been served upon him or her.... Within three days after the service of the notice, the tenant... may perform the conditions or covenants of the lease... and thereby save the lease from forfeiture...." (§ 1161, subd. (3). "Because of the summary nature of an unlawful detainer action, a notice is valid only if the lessor strictly complies with the statutorily mandated notice requirements." (Bevill v. Zoura (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 694, 697, citing Kwok v. Bergren (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 596; see also Parsons v. Superior Court, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th Supp. at p. 6.

The notice must comply with several requirements set forth in section 1161, subdivision (3). The notice must identify the defaulted covenant. (*Delta Imports, Inc. v. Municipal Court* (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 1033, 1036; Feder v. Wreden Packing & Provision Co. (1928) 89 Cal.App. 665, 671.) The notice must also be phrased in the alternate when the covenant is capable of being performed, viz. perform the covenant or quit the premises. (§ 1161, subd. (3); Hinman v. Wagnon (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 24, 27.) That is to say, the notice must convey that "in the event of the failure of the tenant to… perform the defaulted covenant, the [landlord] will exercise his right under the law to regain possession of the premises." (Hinman v. Wagon, supra, at p. 28, citing Feder v. Wreden Packing & Provision Co., supra, at p. 671.) The notice cannot be ambiguous in its phrasing, as it must "clearly, positively, and unequivocally disclose the intention of the landlord to repossess the premises." (Horton-Howard v. Payton (1919) 44 Cal.App. 108, 112, see also Delta Imports, Inc. v. Municipal Court, supra, at p. 1036.)

Also, in order to be legitimate, service of the three-day notice must "strictly comply" with section 1162. (*Liebovich v. Shahrokhkhany* (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 511, 513.) "Section 1162 provides three methods of serving these notices: (1) by personal delivery to the tenant (personal service); or (2) if the tenant is absent from his residence and usual place of business, by leaving a copy with a person of suitable age and discretion at either place, and sending a copy through the mail to the tenant's residence (substituted service); or (3) if a place of residence and usual place of business cannot be ascertained or a person of suitable age or discretion cannot be found there, then by affixing a copy in a conspicuous place on the property and delivering a copy to a person residing there, if such a person can be found, and also sending a copy through the mail addressed to the tenant at the place where the property is situated (post and mail service). [Citations.]" (Losorino v. Mata (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 110, 113-114.)

Herein Defendant was not served with the mandatory three (3) days notice to pay rent or quit, which is the statutory notice requirements and is a prerequisite to filing an unlawful detainer action. In Plaintiff's complaint it asserts that defendant was served through substituted service after attempting personal service, it left a copy of the Notice with or in the presence of a person of suitable age and discretion on 8/10/2020.

This completely untrue and misleading, Defendant was not served and never received the mandatory three (3) days notice to pay rent or quit, Plaintiff's proof of service is insufficient as it could not even Identify the person the notice was delivered to. Mere stating that it left a copy of the Notice with or in the presence of a person of suitable age and discretion on 8/10/2020, is not enough.

It must show that the defendant had knowledge or acknowledged receipt of the said notice. California law is clear: when service is challenged, the plaintiff must submit adequate evidence of effective service stating precisely who received the service on behalf of the defendant, who is the recipient to the defendant, and the place it was served and also it must be mailed to the Defendant.

The service of a valid three-day notice is an element of an unlawful detainer action that must be proven by the lessor at trial. (*Palm Property Investments, LLC v. Yadegar* (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1425.) "'[P]roper service on the lessee of a valid three-day notice to pay rent or quit is an essential prerequisite to a judgment declaring a lessor's right to possession

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under section 1161, subdivision 2. [Citations.]' [Citation.] 'A lessor must allege and prove proper service of the requisite notice. [Citations.] Absent evidence the requisite notice was properly served pursuant to section 1162, no judgment for possession can be obtained. [Citations.]' [Citation.]'' (*Ibid.*)

Therefore, Defendant request this court to reconsider its Judgement. The court has broad discretion on its own motion to try issues in any order that will promote efficiency of litigation. (Buran Equipment Co. v. H. & C. Investment Co. (1983) 142 Cal, App.3d 338, 343; Grappo v. Coventry Financial Corp. (1991) 235 Cal. App.3d 496, 503.) Section 598 provides in part that "the court may [at any time on its own motion] when... the economy and efficiency of handling the litigation would be promoted thereby... make an order... that the trial of any issue or any part thereof shall precede the trial of any other issue or any part thereof in the case...." Similarly, section 1048, subdivision (b) provides in part that "the court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any cause of action,... or of any separate issue...." Finally, Evidence Code section 320 provides that "except as otherwise provided by law, the court in its discretion shall regulate the order of proof." Under these provisions, the trial court had ample authority to try the notice issue first. (Buran Equipment Co. v. H. & C. Investment Co., supra, at p. 343; Grappo v. Coventry Financial Corp., supra, at p. 503.).

Here, the court failed to choose to try the issue of notice before any other presumably as "[s]trict compliance with the specifically prescribed notice conditions is a prerequisite to invoking the summary procedures of unlawful detainer." (*Parsons v. Superior Court (2007)* 149 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 6.) The fairest reading of this court should be a statement that it would handle the "legal threshold issue before it begin the trial," is that it would try the issue of notice first and if it was defective, the court would not have to address the merits of the unlawful detainer claim.

B. EVEN IF THE MANDATORY THREE-DAY NOTICE WAS SERVED TO THE DEFENDANT, IT DOES NOT COMPLIED WITH THE EXECUTIVE ORDER N-28-20 ISSUED BY GOVERNOR GAVIN NEWSOM.

Governor Gavin Newsom previously issued <u>Executive Order N-28-20</u> authorizing local governments to ban evictions for residential and commercial tenants based on nonpayment of rent resulting from a loss of income related to COVID-19.

The <u>Executive Order N-28-20</u> extends the notice period for nonpayment of rent from 3 to 15 days to provide the tenant with additional time to respond to the landlord's notice to pay rent or quit.

Is this present case from the notice attached to Plaintiff's complaint, the notice to pay rent was indicated three days instead of 15 days as provided by the <u>Executive Order N-28-20</u> issued by Governor Gavin Newsom. Plaintiff issued the said notice within the era of COVID-19.

The defendant has been fulfilling her obligations under the lease agreement which includes adequate payment of the rent until the breakout of COVID-19 in January 2020. The COVID-19 pandemic has presented significant challenges to Defendant's business and employees. Small Business Majority survey data found that up to 44% of businesses are at risk of shutting down, including Defendant's Business. From February to April 2020, there was a 22% drop of active business owners nationwide according to data released through the Census Current Population Survey. Minority-owned businesses are disproportionately impacted: the number of active businesses owned by African-Americans dropped by 41%, Latinx by 32%, Asians by 25%, and immigrants by 36%.³ The impact of the COVID-19 was severe that Governor Newsom of California had to signed three bills that will help support small businesses to recover from the COVID-19 induced recession.⁴

In the light of the violation of the <u>Executive Order N-28-20</u> issued by Governor Gavin Newsom. Defendant hereby prays this honorable court to reconsider its order her.

2. THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO REVOKE ITS PRIOR ORDER

The Court has jurisdiction to correct its order sua sponte to conform to law and justice. Code of Civil Procedure Section 128(a)(8) provides that "Every court shall have the power to

³ https://www.gov.ca.gov/2020/09/09/governor-newsom-signs-bills-to-support-small-businesses-grappling-withimpact-of-covid-19-pandemic-bolster-economic-recovery/ ⁴ ibid

do all of the following: ... To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conform to law and justice." See <u>Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc., 126 Cal. App. 4th 726, 739</u> (2005) (By enacting reconsideration statutes, the "Legislature did not, however, attempt to limit the court's sua sponte authoriy.); see also <u>LeFrancois v. Goel, 35 Cal. 4th 1094, 1108 (2005)</u> (the trial court may on its own motion reconsider one of its rulings). The Court should exercise that power here to correct its error and revoke its prior ruling and grant the Motion.

As a separate basis for relief and as earlier stated in this motion, Defendant is seeking correction of the error under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1008, which permits a party who has made application for an order that has been refused in whole or part to make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order based upon "new or different facts, circumstances, or law." Id In *Monarch Healthcare v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. 4 App. 4th 1282 (2000)*, the trial court's sua sponte injection of a new issue that was not briefed by the parties before the court's ruling constitutes "different circumstances" under Section 1008. *Monarch Healthcare, 8 Cal. App. 4th at 1286-87* ("[F]undamental principles of due process also call for those with an interest in the matter to have notice and the opportunity to be heard, so that the ensuing order does not issue like a 'bolt from the blue out of the trial judge's chambers." *(quoting Campisi v. Super. Court, 17 Cal. App. 4th 1833, 1839 (1993))*). The defendant herein has met the "special or different circumstances" prong of Section 1008, reconsideration should be granted, the Order revoked and a new order entered granting this Motion.

3. LIBERAL TREATMENT OF PRO SE PLEADINGS

Additionally, because the defendant defends this case pro se, the Court must construe her filings "liberally" and interpret them "to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." <u>Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006);</u> see also <u>Ruotolo v.</u> <u>I.R.S., 28 F.3d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1994)</u> (explaining that pro se litigants should be afforded "special solicitude" because they are not represented by counsel).

Pro se pleadings generally are held to less stringent standards than those applied to members of the Bar; in reviewing a pro se litigant's motion the court must read the motion less stringently than it would an attorney's. See <u>Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam); Madyun v. Thompson,</u>

657 F.2d 868, 876 (7th Cir. 1981).. See Twyman v. Crisp, 584 F.2d 352, 358 (10th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Tarlton v. Henderson, 467 F.2d 200, 201 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam). A rule mandating that judges inform pro se litigants of their

obligations under Rule 56(e) is necessitated by a layman's inability to discern his obligations from reading the rule, See Ross, <u>777 F.2d at 1219; Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 102 (7th</u> <u>Cir. 1982); Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 4, at 202</u>.⁵

Pro se litigants' labor under the disadvantage of being unable to read procedural rules effectively,⁶ the necessity of judicial notification to pro se litigants is more apparent as the pro se litigant is doubly handicapped by his inability to discern his obligations by his misunderstanding of the consequences of the errors in his pleadings.


This court not granting Defendant's motion would lead to a miscarriage of justice as the court is viewed with utmost respect and with an expectation that the court would do very fair and equitable justice to the person coming before it or pleading for genuine redress of any complaint of grievance. The court should always maintain a fair view that should not only do fair justice but the justice should be pronounced in such a manner that a clear message should be made to everyone that justice is made. The court is the most sanctified body to deliver justice and has always maintained a very strict view regarding fairness in trial procedures and trail fairness in time pass.

⁶, See 1980 Aldisert Report, supra note 12, at 64 (pro se litigants not expected to understand rules).

⁵ But see Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1366- 67 (9th Cir. 1986) (pro se litigant expected to recognize summary judgment obligations without assistance from court). Some courts requiring federal judges to advise pro se litigants of their obligations under Rule 56(e) derive the mandate from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Ross, 777 F.2d at 1219 ("a gloss on the federal rules"); Lewis, 689 F.2d at 101 ("fair inference from the rules").

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4	CONCLUSION For all the foregoing reasons, Defendant respectfully request that reconsideration be
5	granted and the Unlawful Detainer (Commercial) Order against her be vacated as a
6	matter of law.
7	Dated: October 2020
8	Dated: October2020
9	Respectfully submitted;
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11	JIAYI LIU
12	Jamboree Business Centre
13	2691 Richter Avenue, Suite 115.
14	Irvine CA 92606
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4	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICI	C
5	I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of t	
6	October 2020, to all parties on the attached serv	
7		
	SERVICE LIST	
8	Julie A. Ault (SBN 186914)	
9	Leslie F. Vandale (SBN 238823)	
10	7 Corporate Plaza	
11	Newport Beach, CA 92660	
12	Tel. (949) 719-7212	
13	Email: Lvandale@olenproperties.com	
14	Attorneys for Plaintiff, Olen Commercial Realty Corp.	7
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17		IAYI LIU
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2	I,	declare:
3	1.	I make this declaration of my own personal knowledge, except where
4		stated on information and belief, and if called to testify in Court on these
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6		matters, I could do so competently.
7	2.	I am a friend to the Defendant and I have personal knowledge of the
8		matters deposed to here except where otherwise stated to be based on
9 10		information and belief.
10	3.	I have conducted a diligent search of the defendant's case and have
12	_	made appropriate inquiries of others to inform myself in order to make
13		this Declaration.
14		
15	4.	The defendant resides in the city of Irvine, in the State of California.
16	5.	On or about June 7, 2018, Defendant JIAYI LIU entered into a
17		written lease agreement with Plaintiff Olen Commercial Realty Corp, to
18		rent the real property located at 2691 Richter Avenue # 115, Irvine,
19		92606.
20		The large segment of the large 7, 2019 and an the large
21	6.	
22		agreement there is a clause for annual rent adjustment as follows;
23		beginning on July 1, 2019 through June 30, 2020 the minimum Monthly
24		Base Rent shall be \$2,999.00 and beginning on July 1, 2020 through
25		June 30, 2021 the minimum Monthly Base Rent shall be \$3,089.55. The
26		Monthly Base Rent set forth above does not include monthly Common
27		Area Operating Expenses of \$474.32.
28	7.	The defendant has been fulfilling her obligations under the lease
		agreement which includes adequate payment of the rent until the
		- 13 -

breakout of COVID-19 in January 2020. The COVID-19 pandemic has presented significant challenges to Defendant's business and employees.

- 8. On or about October, 2020, Plaintiff filed a complaint for unlawful detainer- commercial against Defendant. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant was wrongfully in possession of the premises. Before filing the said Complaint, defendant was not served with the mandatory three (3) days notice to pay rent or quit.
- 9. On October 21, 2020, the court granted Plaintiff's prayers and order defendant to pay \$17547.00 past due rent, \$6048.00 hold over damages,
- 10. The mandatory notice to pay rent or quit was not served to the defendant.
- 11. In the plaintiff's complaint, the plaintiff attached the mandatory notice which is substantially defective.
- 12. Defendant presently move this Court to reconsider its Order based on the new fact and circumstance above.

I declare, under penalty of perjury, that the foregoing is true and correct under the laws of the State of California and that this declaration was executed on October _____, 2020, in Irvine, California.

Insert the address of the declarant here

